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DEFINING "PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT" FOR THE
CRIMINAL JURY: THE THIRD CIRCUIT ACCEPTS AN INVITATION
TO TOLERATE CONSTITUTIONALLY INADEQUATE PHRASEOLOGY
"The legal system is often a mystery, and we, its priests, preside over ritu-
als baffling to everyday citizens. "I
I. INTRODUCTION
The "reasonable doubt" standard is the most fundamental part of our
criminal justice system. 2 This standard represents society's belief that it is
better that ten guilty persons escape conviction than one innocent person
suffer.3 The standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" was created
to ensure that no person should be convicted of a crime unless the
factfinder is virtually certain of that person's guilt.
4
1. LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM: QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IN
BRIEF 182 (Bruce Nash et al. eds., 1995) (quoting Henry G. Miller, President, New
York State Bar Association).
2. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) ("The reasonable-doubt stan-
dard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure."). In Win-
ship, the Supreme Court constitutionalized the standard of reasonable doubt,
finding that "the standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of in-
nocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' Id. (quoting
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). The requirement of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in American criminal procedure for
compelling reasons. See id. (reasoning that during criminal prosecution, accused
has interests of great importance at stake, both because of possibility he may lose
his liberty upon conviction and because of certainty he would be stigmatized by
conviction); see also United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 107 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting
that convicting person of crime when reasonable doubt remained as to person's
guilt would "seriously undermine the moral force and integrity of our criminal
law"); Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a
Critical Concept, 22 Am. J. CRaM. L. 677, 678 (1995) (recognizing reasonable doubt
standard as "critical to American jurisprudence"); Robert C. Power, Reasonable and
Other Doubts: The Problem ofJury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 45, 46 (1999) (stating
that reasonable doubt is "central feature of our criminal justice system"); Note,
Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1955, 1955
(1995) (noting that reasonable doubt is "central to every criminal trial").
3. See Power, supra note 2, at 52 (discussing Supreme Court's reliance on Wil-
liam Blackstone's statement that "the law holds that it is better that ten guilty es-
cape than that one innocent suffer" (quoting Coffin, 156 U.S. at 456)); cf Winship,
397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt [is] bottomed on [the] fundamental value determina-
tion of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free").
4. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (analyzing meaning of reasonable doubt and
declaring that standard prevents government from finding person guilty "without
convincing a proper factfinder ... with utmost certainty" (emphasis added)); Jack-
son v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (acknowledging that "by impressing upon
(829)
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Although this fundamental standard does not appear in the text of
the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has found that the due
process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "protect[ ]
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."5 The interaction between the defendant's right to acquittal on
evidence that leaves a reasonable doubt of guilt, and the defendant's right
to a trial by jury, necessitates that jurors comprehend and apply the rea-
sonable doubt standard fairly and properly.6
the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the
accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the
criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself" (emphasis added)); United States v.
Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that jurors' subjective
beliefs must be based on reasoned, objective evaluations of evidence and proper
understanding of quantum of proof necessary to establish guilt to near certitude);
see also Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some
Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 111-12 (1999) (maintaining that
we use expression "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" because we believe govern-
ment should be required to prove its case so strongly that evidence leaves jury with
highest degree of certitude based on such evidence).
5. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. In recognizing "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" as a constitutional standard in 1970, the Court supported its finding with
the following statement:
6. [U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the crim-
inal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be di-
luted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free soci-
ety that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence
that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense with-
out convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
Id.
See Power, supra note 2, at 46-47 (identifying intermingling of right to acquit-
tal on evidence which leaves reasonable doubt of guilt, and right to trial by jury).
The merger of these two rights makes proper definition of the standard essential.
See id. at 47 (noting that jury learns of reasonable doubt standard through instruc-
tions from trial judge). Proper definition becomes even more important when
one looks at evidence indicating that jurors do not comprehend the standard and
furthermore do not apply it fairly. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A
Concept in Search of a Definition: The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty
of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 666-69 (1996) (con-
ducting study where subject jurors were given reasonable doubt instructions that
led them to exhibit probabilities of guilt that would be constitutionally unaccept-
able); Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test
Using RealJuries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 97. (1998)
(finding that even after given instruction on reasonable doubt, almost one-third of
jurors mistakenly believed that it becomes defendant's responsibility to persuade
jury of his innocence once state has come forward with evidence of guilt); see also
John Clark, The Social Psychology ofJury Nullification, 24 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 39, 39-46
(2000) (examining research indicating jurors have power to nullify law based on
extra-legal factors such as physical attractiveness, attitudes, social categorization
and judicial biases). For a more thorough discussion of jury nullification, see
Nancy J. King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 50-53
(1999). For a further discussion of jurors' inability to comprehend reasonable
doubt instructions, see infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46: p. 829
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Despite the vital role this standard plays in the American scheme of
criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance re-
garding the propriety of instructing the jury on the meaning of the term
reasonable doubt.7 Due to this lack of guidance, the United States Courts
of Appeals and the highest state courts remain divided in their approaches
to defining the standard.8
7. See Power, supra note 2, at 62 (recognizing that Supreme Court has been
"remarkably tentative in its oversight of what theoretically is a uniform minimum
standard"). The Court has explicitly stated that the Constitution is silent as to
whether trial courts must define the standard. SeeVictor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 9
(1994) (stating that "Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining rea-
sonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course"). But cf id. at 26
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting that "we have never held that the concept of
reasonable doubt is undefinable, or that trial courts should not, as a matter of
course, provide a definition"). Justice Ginsburg also noted that "contrary to the
Court's suggestion . . .we [have] [n]ever held that the Constitution does not re-
quire trial courts to define reasonable doubt." Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
8. The main reason the Court has provided little guidance on the propriety of
instructing juries on the meaning of reasonable doubt is that the Court may only
conduct plenary review of instructions. See David 0. Stewart, Uncertainty About Rea-
sonable Doubt, ABA J.,June 1994, at 38 (acknowledging that Supreme Court's only
power over state courts is to decide specific cases appealed to them). Therefore,
the Court does not have the power to order state courts to use a specific instruc-
tion. See id. (recognizing that because state jury instructions in Victor did not vio-
late due process, Court could not order California and Nebraska courts to use
instruction it thought was superior).
For discussion of approaches taken by the United States Courts of Appeals, see
infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text. The approaches taken by the highest
state courts vary widely. Several states require that trial courts must provide a defi-
nition. See, e.g., State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H. 1980) (holding that de-
spite difficulty inherent in task of defining reasonable doubt, jury must be given
some assistance in understanding concept); Commonwealth v. Young, 317 A.2d
258, 262-63 (Pa. 1972) ("Our cases require that the jury be given a positive instruc-
tion fully and accurately defining reasonable doubt ... in the absence of a proper
reasonable doubt charge, an accused is denied his right to a fair trial."); State v.
Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I. 1989) ("In charging the jury, a trial justice must
explain the definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v. Coe, 684
P.2d 668, 677 (Wash. 1984) (stressing that Washington law requires court to define
standard of reasonable doubt by specific instruction).
Other states do not require trial courts to define the standard, but nonethe-
less favor definition over silence. See, e.g., McKinley v. State, 379 N.E.2d 968, 969
(Ind. 1978) (stating that trial courts should consider patterned criminal instruc-
tions that are available to all courts); State v. Uffelman, 626 A.2d 340, 342 (Me.
1993) (affirming previously stated preference toward definition); State v. Olkon,
299 N.W.2d 89, 105 (Minn. 1980) (asserting that defining reasonable doubt in-
struction is "tendered").
Furthermore, there are some states that have refused to define the standard
altogether. See, e.g., Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829, 850 (Miss. 1994) (maintaining
that "reasonable doubt defines itself and needs no further definition by the
court"); State v. Johnson, 445 S.E.2d 637, 637 (S.C. 1994) (upholding trial court's
refusal to define reasonable doubt and commenting that expression "without an
explanation of its legal significance is much more favorable to a defendant"); State
v. McMahon, 603 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Vt. 1992) ("We have never held that a defen-
dant is entitled to an explanation of 'reasonable doubt' .... ").
2001]
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In 1932, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit be-
came the first circuit court to require that the reasonable doubt standard
be defined for the criminaljury. 9 The Third Circuit has since struggled in
determining what terminology is sufficient to ensure that jurors do not
apply a subjective standard of proof below that required by due process. 1
The inconsistent decisions on this subject, handed down by the Supreme
Court over the past ten years, have not made their task any less
challenging. I I
This Casebrief focuses on the development of the reasonable doubt
standard in the Third Circuit. Part II begins with an overview of the
United States Supreme Court decisions that have analyzed the constitu-
tional adequacy of reasonable doubt jury instructions. 12 This Section fur-
ther discusses the effect of the Supreme Court's rulings on cases in the
United States Courts of Appeals.' 3 Part III focuses specifically on the
Third Circuit's approach to the standard of reasonable doubt, examining
different definitions that have been provided in an attempt to clarify the
standard.14 This Section further foreshadows the fate of particular phrase-
ology within the Third Circuit. 15 Finally, Part IV considers the practical
application of the Third Circuit's approach, how it may present problems
for criminal defendants challenging the constitutionality of such instruc-
tions, and what trial judges can do to ensure that the instructions they
provide are constitutionally adequate.1 6
9. See Blatt v. United States, 60 F.2d 481, 481 (3d Cir. 1932) (holding that trial
court's failure to provide instruction upon meaning of reasonable doubt was error
prejudicial to defendant); see also Cohen, supra note 2, at 682 (acknowledging that
Third Circuit was first to require definition, followed next by Tenth Circuit in
1954).
10. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's struggle in deciding what
phraseology is constitutionally sufficient, see infra notes 86-134 and accompanying
text.
11. For further discussion of the inconsistent precedent produced by the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), and
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994), see infra notes 25-31 & 38-54 and accompany-
ing text.
12. For further discussion of the relevant Supreme Court decisions, see infra
notes 17-85 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of the circuit courts' application of reasonable
doubt definitions, see infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
14. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to defining reason-
able doubt, see infra notes 86-134 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of the future of specific definitions within the
Third Circuit, see infra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
16. For further discussion of the practical application of the reasonable doubt
standard in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46: p. 829
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN
UNWORKABLE STANDARD
A. The Supreme Court Renders "Reasonable Doubt" Standardless
United States courts have applied the reasonable doubt standard
since at least the 1700s.1 7 The mid-nineteenth century brought a wide
acceptance of the standard as the accurate description of the degree of
doubt necessary for an acquittal. 18 Nevertheless, the United States Su-
preme Court refrained from granting the standard constitutional status
until 1970 when it decided In re Winship.19 In Winship, the Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects
a defendant from conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. '20
Since Winship, however, the Court has not mandated that trial courts
employ any particular set of words to convey the concept of reasonable
doubt to jurors.21 The Court has held only that constitutionally deficient
jury instructions on reasonable doubt demand an automatic reversal of
17. See Robert H. Cochran, State v. Jackson: Defining "Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt," 20 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 435, 435 (1997) (acknowledging that states have
had to show proof beyond reasonable doubt from earliest years of nation); Henry
A. Diamond, Reasonable Doubt To Define, or Not to Define, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1716,
1716-17 (1990) (supporting theory that standard existed since at least late 1700s);
Thomas L. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt. How in the World Is it Defined?, 12 Am. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 199-200 (1997) (noting there are two primary accounts as to
precise origin and development of reasonable doubt). One theory claims that the
standard originated in the Irish Treason Trials in 1798. See id. at 200 (discussing
theory outlined by Judge John Wilder May in 1876 article). The other theory con-
tends that American courts used the phrase earlier in the eighteenth century. See
id. (distinguishing theory that claims 1770 Boston Massacre Trials was first use of
reasonable doubt).
18. See Shelagh Kenney, Fifth Amendment-Upholding the Constitutional Merit of
Misleading Reasonable Doubt Jury Instructions, 85J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 989, 991-
92 & n.13 (1995) (citing cases and treatises that discuss state courts' acceptance of
reasonable doubt standard in nineteenth century).
19. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Prior to Winship, the Court upheld a variety of in-
structions on reasonable doubt, but failed to provide any extensive analysis. See
Power, supra note 2, at 56-58 (analyzing Court's acceptance of moral certainty and
hesitate to act approaches). Power notes that the Court upheld a moral certainty
instruction in 1914. See id. at 56-57 n.54 (citing Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563,
569-70 (1914)). Power further identifies several cases in which the Court sustained
hesitate to act instructions. See id. at 56-58 (discussing commonly cited opinions of
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887) and Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121
(1854)).
20. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis in
Winship, see supra notes 2-5.
21. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (stressing that "so long as the
court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt .... the Constitution does not require that any particular
form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof'
(citation omitted)); see also Timothy P. O'Neill, Instructing Illinois Juries on the Defini-
tion of "Reasonable Doubt": The Need for Reform, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 921, 925-26
2001] CASEBRIEF 833
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conviction. 22 In the 1990s, the Court considered a series of cases which
immersed it in the analysis of the constitutional sufficiency of different
reasonable doubt definitions.23 Taken together, these decisions make the
application of the standard among lower courts problematic, by drawing
illogical lines and producing inconsistent precedent.2
4
1. The Cage v. Louisiana Decision
In 1990 the United States Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana,
2 5
and held for the first time that a state court's reasonable doubt definition
violated the Due Process Clause. 26 In the unanimous decision, the Court
set out the language of the erroneous instruction, emphasizing three of
the lower court's statements: (1)"[i]t must be such doubt as would give
rise to a grave uncertainty;" (2)"[i]t is an actual and substantial doubt," and
(3)"[w]hat is required is ... a moral certainty.'" 27 The Court declared the
instruction unconstitutional because it suggested a "higher degree of
doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt stan-
(1996) (averring that Court has refused to require trial courts to define fundamen-
tal standard of reasonable doubt).
22. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (holding that denial of
right to verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is type of structural error that
defies analysis by "harmless error" standard).
23. For further discussion of Supreme Court cases analyzing the constitu-
tional sufficiency of certain instructions in the 1990s, see infra notes 25-54 and
accompanying text.
24. See Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Instructing on Reasonable Doubt After Victor v.
Nebraska: A Trial Judge's Certain Thoughts on Certainty, 41 VILL. L. REv. 365, 382
(1996) (arguing that decisions in Cage and Victor taken together show how fluid
and standardless Court's methodology has become); see also Kenney, supra note 18,
at 113 (contending that Court erred in deciding Victor because it restricted unani-
mous holding in Cage to its facts).
25. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
26. See id. at 41 (holding that reasonable juror could have interpreted instruc-
tion to allow finding of guilt based on degree of proof below that required by Due
Process Clause); see also O'Neill, supra note 21, at 926 (noting that Cage was first
decision in which Court found jury instruction defining reasonable doubt to be
violation of due process).
27. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41. The Cage instruction, in pertinent part, stated:
This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is
founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere ca-
price and conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would give rise to a grave
uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character
of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possi-
ble doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable
man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or math-
ematical certainty, but a moral certainty.
State v. Cage, 554 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. 1989) (second emphasis added), rev'd sub nom.
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
834 [Vol. 46: p. 829
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dard."28 On remand, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court held the er-
ror harmless under the harmless error doctrine.2 9
This deceptively straightforward decision has been attacked for its un-
due focus on the technical aspects of the definition and its failure to clar-
ify whether the unconstitutionality of a jury instruction depends upon the
presence of all three critical phrases (substantial doubt, grave uncertainty,
and moral certainty).30 The variation of lower courts' application of these
three phrases is illustrative of the confusion stemming from the Cage
decision.3 1
2. The Sullivan v. Louisiana Decision
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Louisian1 2
further accelerated the mass of challenges that the Cage decision pro-
duced.3 3 The jury instruction struck down in Sullivan was virtually identi-
cal to the charge given in Cage, using all three terms (substantial doubt,
grave uncertainty and moral certainty).34
28. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41. The Court stated that:
It is plain to us that the words "substantial" and "grave," as they are com-
monly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for
acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard. When those statements
are then considered with the reference to "moral certainty," rather than
evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree
of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
29. See Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1127-29 (holding that because erroneous instruc-
tion was trial error, and not structural defect, it was subject to harmless error
analysis).
30. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty: Two Case Studies on Jury
Misgivings and the Misunderstood Standard of Proof 2 CRIM. L.F. 1, 35 (1990) (criticiz-
ing holding in Cage as highly technical reading of trial court's instructions); Matt
Nichols, Note, Victor v. Nebraska: The "Reasonable Doubt" Dilemma, 73 N.C. L. REv.
1709, 1720 (1995) (positing whether presence of all three problematic phrases is
required for finding of unconstitutionality).
31. Compare Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 984 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ("Obvi-
ously, it was not the use of any one of the terms used in Cage, but rather the combi-
nation of all three that rendered the charge in Cage unconstitutional."), with
Morley v. Stenberg, 828 F. Supp. 1413, 1419 (D. Neb. 1993) (concluding that
phrases "actual and substantial doubt," "moral certainty" and "strong probabili-
ties," when used either together or separately, are unconstitutional because they
lessen level of guilt needed to be established by government), rev'd, 25 F.3d 687
(8th Cir. 1994).
32. 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
33. See Power, supra note 2, at 59 (recognizing that Cage opened door to "raft
of challenges"); see also Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, supra
note 2, at 1955 (maintaining that Court's ruling in Cage, which held that constitu-
tionally deficient reasonable doubt instructions demand automatic reversal, has
made need to determine appropriate content of such instructions especially
significant).
34. See O'Neill, supra note 21, at 928 (stating that trial court in Sullivan gave
reasonable doubt instruction very similar to one given in Cage). The instruction in
Sullivan, in pertinent part, states:
2001] CASEBRIEF 835
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The Sullivan decision then went further than Cage and considered
whether harmless error analysis applies to such unconstitutional instruc-
tions.3 5 Finding that the Sullivan charge violated not only the defendant's
due process rights, but also his right to a jury finding of guilt, the Court
held that such an error is a basic structural defect in the underlying crimi-
nal case and therefore cannot be deemed harmless. 36 Thus, under the
holding of Sullivan, the giving of a constitutionally deficient reasonable
doubt instruction is among those constitutional errors that require an au-
tomatic reversal of conviction. 37
3. The Victor v. Nebraska Decision
Less than a year after Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court re-
treated in substance and produced inconsistent precedent when it upheld
two reasonable doubt instructions in Victor v. Nebraska.38 In this harshly
criticized decision, the Court confronted two consolidated cases, one from
California and the other from Nebraska. 39 The California instruction
used the moral certainty language. 40 The Nebraska instruction used the
moral certainty language as well as the substantial doubt phrase.4'
This doubt must be a reasonable one; that is, one founded upon a real,
tangible, substantial basis, and not upon mere caprice, fancy or conjec-
ture. It must be such a doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty,
raised in your minds by reason of the unsatisfactory character of the evi-
dence; one that would make you feel that you had not an abiding convic-
tion to a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt .... A reasonable doubt
is not a mere possible doubt. It should be an actual or substantial doubt.
State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 185 n.3 (La. 1992) (quoting trial transcript at 566-
68).
35. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-82 (conducting analysis of constitutional er-
rors that have and have not been held amenable to harmless-error analysis).
36. See id. at 281-82 (holding that such error is basic structural defect in un-
derlying case and therefore cannot be deemed harmless because burden of proof
instruction permitting conviction on less than proof beyond reasonable doubt de-
nies constitutional right to jury trial).
37. See id. at 281 (distinguishing structural errors from trial errors and stating
that structural errors require automatic reversal of conviction).
38. 511 U.S. 1 (1994), affg State v. Victor, 494 N.W.2d 565 (Neb. 1993), and
People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1992).
39. For further discussion of criticisms of the decision in Victor, see infra notes
52-54 and accompanying text.
40. See Kenney, supra note 18, at 996 (laying out instruction trial court gave to
jury at end of guilt phase). In pertinent part, the California instruction states:
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt;
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of
the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they can-
not say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth
of the charge.
Id.
41. See id. at 998-99 (reiterating instruction given by Nebraska trial court to
jury at close of trial). The Nebraska court gave the following instruction:
[Vol. 46: p. 829
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, analyzed each defect sepa-
rately.4 2 Her moral certainty analysis traced the history and meaning of
the phrase, ultimately concluding that it retained enough of its original
meaning not to understate the prosecution's burden of proof.43 After an-
alyzing its use in conjunction with the term "abiding conviction," the
Court concluded that the moral certainty language was consistent with
due process, but that its further use would not be "condoned" by the
Court.
4 4
The United States Supreme Court then tried to distinguish Cage from
Victor by noting that in Estelle v. McGuire4 5 the Court clarified that the
proper inquiry as to whether the jury instruction is unconstitutional is "not
whether the instruction 'could have' been applied in an unconstitutional
manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so
apply it." ' 4 6 The Court further distinguished Cage by maintaining that the
context in which the substantial doubt language was used in Victor was
"Reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and pru-
dent person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life,
to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and rely-
ing and acting thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit you, after
full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an abid-
ing conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the
same time, absolute or mathematical certainty is not required .... A
reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt reasonably arising
from the evidence, from the facts and circumstances shown by the evi-
dence, or from the lack of evidence on the part of the state, as distin-
guished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare
imagination, or from fanciful conjecture.
Id.
42. See generally Victor, 511 U.S. at 1 (separately analyzing each alleged defect
with special emphasis on history of moral certainty language and context of sub-
stantial doubt).
43. See id. at 10-17 (recognizing that moral certainty phrase is not "mainstay of
the modern lexicon," but maintaining that it does not mean anything different
today than it did in nineteenth century).
44. See id. at 14 (defending use of "moral certainty" in Victor because simulta-
neous use of "abiding conviction" in Sandoval's case lends content to phrase).
The Court seems to have ignored the fact that the instruction upheld in Sullivan
also paired the moral certainty phrase with the abiding conviction language. See
State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 186 n.3 (La.. 1992) (reproducing trial court's
original charge, which stated that doubt must be "one that would make you feel
that you had not an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt"
(first emphasis added)).
45. 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
46. Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 n.4). The Court does
not mention, however, that two years after Estelle the Court struck down an instruc-
tion identical, in pertinent part, to the one in Cage. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 277 (1993) (finding Sullivan instruction "essentially identical" to instruc-
tion in Cage, and therefore unconstitutional). Furthermore, the Court refused to
consider the State's argument that the standard of review in Cage was contradicted
by Estelle. See id. at 278.
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different from that in Cage.47 The Court emphasized that in Victor, the
trial court used the phrase as a reference to a doubt's existence (rather
than to its size) by comparing substantial to "mere possibility," "bare imag-
ination" and "fanciful conjecture."48
The Victor majority also gave an alternative justification for upholding
the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction in Nebraska, con-
ceding that the equation of a reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt
may have overstated the degree of doubt necessary to acquit.49 Justice
O'Connor found that the instruction's additional definition of reasonable
doubt as a "doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act,"
provided a "common-sense benchmark" that overcame the otherwise defi-
cient terminology in the charge. 50 The majority concluded that, as a
whole, both the California and Nebraska reasonable doubt instructions
"correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt," and, therefore,
there was no reasonable likelihood that the juries in the two cases applied
the instructions in an unconstitutional manner.5 1
Critics have challenged many aspects of the Victor opinion. Commen-
tators have harshly criticized the Court's attempt to distinguish Cage on
the substantial doubt issue. 52 Scholars have also questioned the Court's
tolerance of the moral certainty language in Victor.53 The opinion is seen
47. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 20 (arguing that concern in Cage is not present be-
cause Victor instruction makes clear that "substantial" is used in sense of existence,
rather than magnitude, of doubt).
48. See id. ("Any ambiguity, however, is removed by reading the phrase in the
context of the sentence in which it appears: 'A reasonable doubt is an actual and
substantial doubt . . . as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility,
from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture.'" (emphasis in original)).
The Cage instruction, however, used almost identical language: "[It] is one that is
founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and
conjecture." State v. Cage, 554 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Cage v.
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). Similarly, the instruction in Sullivan stated that a
reasonable doubt is "one founded upon a real, tangible, substantial basis, and not
upon mere caprice, fancy or conjecture." State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 185 n.3
(La. 1992) (quoting trial transcript at 566-68).
49. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 20-21 (stating that "to the extent the word 'substan-
tial' denotes the quantum of doubt necessary for acquittal, the hesitate to act stan-
dard gives a commonsense benchmark for just how substantial such a doubt must
be"). But see id. at 23-28 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that hesitate to act
terminology is inapplicable and ambiguous).
50. See id. 20-21 (maintaining that it was reasonably likely thatjury interpreted
instruction to indicate that doubt must not be anything other than reasonable).
51. See id. at 22 (holding there is no reasonable likelihood that jurors who
determined petitioners' guilt applied instructions in way that violated
Constitution).
52. See, e.g., Fortunato, supra note 24, at 383 (finding no "articulable and prin-
cipled" bases for distinction); Kenney, supra note 18, at 1017 & n.230 (noting that
Court assumes juries will understand distinction drawn by Court).
53. See, e.g., Kenney, supra note 18, at 1013-14 (asserting that insufficient
weight was given to change in meaning of moral certainty phrase over time);
Mulrine, supra note 17, at 207-08 & n.91 (arguing that although legally acceptable,
such instructions "may be incomprehensible to the average juror").
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as an unwarranted narrowing of the unanimous Cage decision because it
inadequately distinguishes itself from Cage and fails to recognize that le-
gally correct instructions may be incomprehensible to the average juror.54
B. Lower Federal Courts Take Advantage of an Erroneously Fluid Standard
In Victor, the Supreme Court failed to take an opportunity to solve the
confusion as to reasonable doubt jury instructions. 5 5 By noting that the
Constitution does not speak as to whether trial courts must define reasona-
ble doubt, and by upholding phrases that the Court finds "somewhat prob-
lematic" (and will not "condone"), lower federal courts are left with the
power to adopt a variety of positions. 56
1. Broad Discretion in Defining Reasonable Doubt
Organizing the United States Courts of Appeals into rigid categories
of definition is difficult because each circuit, at some point, has waivered
on its position as to what constitutes an adequate reasonable doubt defini-
tion.57 The circuit courts can, however, be separated into three categories
concerning their choice of whether to give a definition at all: (1) courts
requiring a definition, (2) courts prohibiting a definition, and (3) courts
leaving the decision to the discretion of the trial court.5 8
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Eighth, Tenth and
District of Columbia Circuits hold that it is error for a judge to refuse to
give ajury an instruction defining reasonable doubt.59 These circuits base
this requirement on the importance of the reasonable doubt standard and
54. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (finding no meaningful difference between Victor and Cage); see also Power,
supra note 2, at 61 (stating that Victor opinion is "unconvincing on its own terms"
and "inadequately distinguished from Cage").
55. See Fortunato, supra note 24, at 367 (noticing that Court "scuttled" chance
to provide trial judges with clear direction regarding standard).
56. For further discussion of the variety of positions adopted by the lower
courts, see infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text.
57. Compare, e.g., Gaines v. Kelly, 202 F.3d 598, 609-10 (2d Cir. 2000) (striking
down instruction with moral certainty language), with Langert v. Scully, No. 96-
2569, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34172, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 1997) (upholding moral
certainty language in instruction).
58. For further discussion of how the circuit courts fall into these categories,
see infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ac-
knowledging that giving definition remains practice in District of Columbia Cir-
cuit); United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir. 1974) (establishing
defendant's right to have meaning of reasonable doubt explained to jury); Fried-
man v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1967) ("In the first place, it was
the court's duty to instruct on the meaning of 'reasonable doubt' and failure to do
so upon request would constitute error."); Blatt v. United States, 60 F.2d 481, 481
(3d Cir. 1932) (holding that failure to define constituted reversible error).
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the realization that the term reasonable doubt is not so commonplace,
simple and clear that its meaning is self-evident to jurors.60
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Cir-
cuits historically have warned against defining reasonable doubt.61 Even
in the face of a jury request for a definition, the Fourth and Seventh Cir-
cuits maintain that any possible definition would only make the instruc-
tions more complicated and confusing.6 2 Nevertheless, these courts have
acknowledged that they cannot reverse a trial court that correctly defines
the term.
63
Most appellate courts have left the decision whether or not to define
reasonable doubt to the discretion of the trial court.64 These circuits will
then provide review under an abuse of discretion or totality of the circum-
stances test.65 The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have recognized the arguments
on both sides of the issue and have left the choice among acceptable lin-
guistic alternatives to the trial judge. 66
2. Parsing Out Definitions After Victor
Regardless of the path an appellate court has chosen to follow, they
nonetheless have all reviewed the constitutional adequacy of reasonable
60. See United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 728 (3d Cir. 1999)
(stressing that reasonable doubt is not easy concept for jurors to grasp); see also
Diamond, supra note 17, at 1719 (reciting several reasons why courts choose to
define reasonable doubt); Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, supra
note 2, at 1958-59 (stating reasons why courts feel term is capable of definition).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 2000) (up-
holding trial court's refusal to define standard); United States v. Clancy, 175 F.3d
1021 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion) (affirming it is "well established" in
Seventh Circuit that trial courts should not attempt to define standard of reasona-
ble doubt).
62. See Solan, supra note 4, at 115-16 (analyzing Fourth and Seventh Circuits'
beliefs that definition is impossible, that phrase is self-evident, and that every at-
tempt to explain renders explanation of that explanation necessary).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that definition is reversible error only if misleading or confusing); United
States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1060 (4th Cir. 1985) ("In no way were the instruc-
tions 'misleading or confusing,' and, viewed in the context of the charge as a
whole, 'correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt"').
64. For further discussion of circuit courts that leave discretion to the trial
judge, see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987) (pro-
viding review under abuse of discretion test); Whiteside v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869,
871-73 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying totality of circumstances test).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451, 456-57 (11th Cir. 1993)
(recognizing broad discretion of trial judge in formulating instruction); United
States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (designating deci-
sion to define reasonable doubt to sound discretion of trial court); United States v.
Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that "we do not wish to
be interpreted as prescribing a preferred approach").
840 [Vol. 46: p. 829
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doubt instructions. 67 Since the decision in Victor, the circuit courts have
reviewed a variety of definitions, most of which were found to correctly
convey the concept of reasonable doubt when analyzed as a whole. 68 Not
surprisingly, the definitions struck down in Cage and Sullivan, and later
revived in Victor, are making a comeback in American courts despite the
Supreme Court's recognition that such phrases are problematic. 69
Ten of the twelve circuits that hear criminal appeals have reviewed-
and ultimately upheld instructions using the moral certainty phraseology
despite their (and the Supreme Court's) unwillingness to "condone" the
definition. 70 The Second Circuit is the only circuit to strike down a moral
certainty instruction since Victor.7 1 The same court, however, has also up-
held an instruction containing this phraseology. 72 The Second Circuit dis-
tinguished its cases through the language contained in the remainder of
each of the instructions.
73
Six of the twelve circuits that hear criminal appeals have reviewed and,
upheld instructions equating reasonable doubt with substantial doubt de-
spite the Supreme Court's determination that the term is "somewhat prob-
lematic." 74 Again, the Second Circuit is the only circuit to strike down an
instruction containing the substantial doubt language since the Victor deci-
67. For further discussion of the circuit courts' review of reasonable doubt
instructions, see infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding
that instruction, taken as whole, correctly conveyed standard to jury).
69. See, e.g., Williams v. Matesanz, 230 F.3d 421, 429 (1st Cir. 2000) (uphold-
ing moral certainty language in instruction); Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 811-
12 (5th Cir. 1998) (defending use of grave uncertainty language); Truesdale v.
Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 757 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming instruction using substantial
doubt language).
70. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Cain, 201 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding
instruction using moral certainty phrase); Baker, 220 F.3d at 292-93 (same); Swasey
v. Gile, No. 99-55517, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31198, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2000)
(same); Ingham v. Tillery, No. 99-3123, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 33406 (10th Cir.
Dec. 21, 1999) (same); Wallace v. Parke, No. 96-1245, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
18007, at *8 (7th Cir. July 15, 1997) (same); Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 846-67
(6th Cir. 1997) (same); Langert v. Scully, No. 96-2569, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
34172, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 1997) (same); Felker v. Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303, 1310
(11th Cir. 1996) (same); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir. 1995)
(same); United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1225 (3d Cir. 1995) (same).
71. See Gaines v. Kelly, 202 F.3d 598, 609-10 (2d Cir. 2000) (striking down
instruction with moral certainty phrase because cumulative effect was too
uncertain).
72. See Langert, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34172, at *3 (holding that instruction,
as whole, was proper).
73. See id. at *3 (maintaining that "[w]e have previously noted that every un-
helpful, unwise, or even erroneous formulation of the concept of reasonable
doubt does not render a charge improper").
74. See, e.g., West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 64 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding in-
struction with substantial doubt language); Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1126
(10th Cir. 2000) (same); Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998)
(same); Truesdale, 142 F.3d at 757 (same); Harvell v. Nagle, 58 F.3d 1541, 1544
(11th Cir. 1995) (same); Bias v. Ieyoub, 36 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).
13
Corwin: Defining Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt for the Criminal Jury: T
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
sion.7 5 All six circuits have, however, noted their reservations as to the use
of the term.
76
Since Victor, the Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that has reviewed an
instruction containing the grave uncertainty language. 77 In Morris v.
Cain,78 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck
down a charge almost identical to the ones in Cage and Sullivan, which
contained the grave uncertainty, substantial doubt and moral certainty
language. 79 The Fifth Circuit noted how Victor "muddied the water sur-
rounding the constitutionality of reasonable doubt instructions" by creat-
ing the "slipperiest of slopes."8
0
The most acceptable form of instruction among the circuit courts is
that a reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a person to hesitate
before acting in matters of importance to themselves.8 1 Since Justice
O'Connor's commendation of the phrase in Victor, seven of the twelve cir-
cuits, including the Third Circuit, have upheld instructions with this phra-
seology.8 2 Nonetheless, this terminology is not without its critics-one of
the strongest being Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg. 3
Overall, the post-Victor decisions among the circuit courts, including
the Third Circuit, reveal an eager acceptance of the Supreme Court's invi-
tation to uphold reasonable doubt charges that contain otherwise consti-
75. See United States v. Birbal, 62 F.3d 456, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1995) (declaring
instruction with substantial doubt language unconstitutional).
76. See, e.g., Tillman, 215 F.3d at 1126 (noting that substantial doubt language
is far from exemplary).
77. See Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 811-12 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
instruction equating reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty").
78. 186 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1999).
79. See id. at 586 (finding reasonable likelihood that jurors were led down
unconstitutional path).
80. See id.
81. SeeJon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt, "68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 982
(1993) (describing "hesitate to act" as most widely used explanation).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Monegro, No. 99-1505, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
1878, at *6 (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2000) (upholding instruction using hesitate to act lan-
guage); United States v. Rosso, 179 F.3d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); United
States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 203-04 (3d Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Kazand-
jian, Ca. No. 94-50254, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35999, at *7-8 (9th Cir. Nov. 4,1997)
(same); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 1996) (overruled on
other grounds) (same); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 264 (1st Cir. 1995) (up-
holding instruction but declaring language as "arguably unhelpful"); United States
v. Taylor, No. 94-3853, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32103, at *17 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 1995)
(approving hesitate to act language).
83. SeeVictor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(agreeing with strong criticisms by Federal Judicial Center and Second Circuit
Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman whom express concern about comparison of deci-
sions in private matters to decision in criminal trial). In discussing the hesitate to
act terminology, ChiefJudge Newman notes that "[a]lthough, as a district judge, I
dutifully repeated that bit of 'guidance' to juries in scores of criminal trials, I was
always bemused by its ambiguity." Newman, supra note 81, at 982-83.
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tutionally impermissible phrases and concepts.8 4  So long as the
instruction contains one or more acceptable statements of the govern-
ment's burden, positioned close enough to cast a saving glow, the instruc-
tion will be sustained .
5
III. ANALYSIS OF "PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT" IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
A. Defining Reasonable Doubt in the Third Circuit Prior to Victor
v. Nebraska
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consid-
ered the constitutionality of reasonable doubt instructions since at least
1914.86 In 1932, in Blatt v. United States,8 7 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit became the first circuit to hold that it is preju-
dicial error if a trial court does not define the standard of reasonable
doubt to jurors.8 8 The Third Circuit recognized that a defendant is enti-
tled to a "clear and unequivocal charge by the court" that the guilt of the
defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.8 9 Trial courts' def-
84. For further discussion of these decisions, see supra notes 67-84 & infra
notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Mitchell, 73 F.3d 1262, 1266 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that although instruction contained "incorrect statement of law which should
never be made," instruction did not rise to level of due process violation when
context was examined).
86. See Kulp v. United States, 210 F. 249, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1914) (approving
instruction defining reasonable doubt as one "which would be raised in the minds
of reasonable men by the evidence in the case, and which will require evidence to
remove, and not a doubt raised by some whim, caprice, or prejudice on the part of
any of the jurors").
87. 60 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1932).
88. See id. at 481 (holding it was error prejudicial to defendant not to give
instruction on meaning of term). In Blatt, the instruction requested by the defen-
dant and refused by the court, contained the moral certainty phraseology. See id.
(refusing to charge that "'reasonable doubt' is that condition of the mind that
leaves the jury in such a state of mind, . . . that they cannot say they have an
abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge"). The Third
Circuit has further held that it is error prejudicial to the defendant to provide an
Allen charge when a juror is demonstrably confused as to the instruction given on
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Burley, 460 F.2d 998, 999 (3d Cir. 1972)
(holding that "a juror should not be subjected to judicial pressure to vote contrary
to his honest bestjudgment"). In Burley, after the jury requested a clarification on
the meaning of reasonable doubt, the trial judge instructed the jury that:
If this jury cannot agree, the case is going to have to be tried again. It
took almost a week-did take a week-and all those witnesses are going
to have to be called back to testify again. They will be subject to examina-
tion, cross-examination, and so forth. So, it is not an insignificant event
when ajury does not agree in a case like this. It can produce great addi-
tional expense to the government and additional- well, I think I have
said enough.
Id.
89. Compare United States v. Crescent-Kelvan Co., 164 F.2d 582, 588-89 (3d
Cir. 1948) (determining that use of preponderance of evidence phraseology in
2001]
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initions that can be understood as diluting or impairing the constitutional
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt thus demand an auto-
matic reversal. 90
Despite its recognition of the fundamental nature of the standard, the
Third Circuit historically has held that a trial judge need not follow some
"ritual" or use the precise words found in other decisions when defining
reasonable doubt.9 1 As a result, nearly all reasonable doubt instructions
challenged in the Third Circuit prior to (and after) Victor were found to
be constitutionally adequate. 92 Such instructions include the moral cer-
tainty, substantial doubt and hesitate to act language. 93
instruction defining reasonable doubt was not clear and unequivocal and may well
have misled jury), with United States v. Smith, 468 F.2d 381, 383 (3d Cir. 1972)
(finding instruction using substantial reasonable doubt terminology to be clear
and unequivocal when examined as whole).
90. See United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 1979) (developing
district court requirement that prevents courts from using language that dilutes or
impairs standard); see also United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 1978)
(stating that "district courts in this circuit shall not use language in instructions
that reasonably can be interpreted as shifting the burden to the accused to pro-
duce proof of innocence").
91. See United States v. Schireson, 116 F.2d 881, 883 (3d Cir. 1941) (stating
"[w]e do not believe it to be the law that a trial judge must make this a matter of
ritual and use the precise words found in a decision either in Pennsylvania or else-
where"); see also United States v. Meisch, 370 F.2d 768, 774-75 (3d Cir. 1966) (de-
ciding trial judge "need not follow some ritual").
92. See West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 64 (3d Cir. 2000) (declaring instruction
constitutionally adequate); United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1998)
(same); United States v.Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1225 (3d Gir. 1995) (same); Flamer
v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 757 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Polan, 970
F.2d 1280, 1286 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); Pine, 609 F.2d at 109 (same); United States
v. De Lazo, 497 F.2d 1168, 1171 (3d Cir. 1974) (same); Smith, 468 F.2d at 383
(same); United States v. Restaino, 369 F.2d 544, 546 (3d Cir. 1966) (same);
Berkowitz v. United States, 5 F.2d 967, 967 (3d Cir. 1925) (per curiam) (same);
Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1922) (same); Gray v. United
States, 266 F. 355, 357 (3d Cir. 1920) (same); Kulp v. United States, 210 F. 249,
252-53 (3d Cir. 1914) (same). But see United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719,
734 (3d Cir. 1999) (striking down reasonable doubt instruction); United States v.
Link, 202 F.2d 592, 594 (3d Cir. 1953) (same); United States v. Augustine, 189 F.2d
587, 591 (3d Cir. 1951) (same); Crescent-Kelvan Co., 164 F.2d at 588 (same); Blatt,
60 F.2d at 481 (same).
93. See, e.g., Polan, 970 F.2d at 1286 (finding "honest doubt" to be equivalent
to common admonition that jury should base its verdict on reason rather than
emotion); De Lazo, 497 F.2d at 1171 n.5 (promoting instruction using hesitate to
act language); Smith, 468 F.2d at 382 (noting defendant was "picking at straws" by
arguing instruction using "substantial reasonable doubt" was prejudicial); Restaino,
369 F.2d at 546 (finding instruction stating "[p] roof beyond a reasonable doubt is
established if the evidence is such as you would be willing to rely upon and act
upon in the most important of your own affairs" would be more properly stated in
terms of doubt that would cause person to hesitate to act); Berkowitz, 5 F.2d at 967
(finding no error in instruction using moral certainty language).
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Prior to Victor, the Third Circuit found reversible error in only three
cases-two of which were based on mere technicalities.9 4 The third case
involved a challenge to a charge called the two-inference instruction,
which directs the jury to acquit when the evidence is as consistent with
innocence as it is with guilt.95 Following in the footsteps of the Supreme
Court, the Third Circuit has made challenges to reasonable doubt instruc-
tions futile by upholding definitions that it would not necessarily
"condone."9 6
B. Fate of Linguistic Alternatives After Victor
Constitutional challenges to reasonable doubt instructions within the
Third Circuit have become more difficult to establish since Victor.97 The
Third Circuit has considered five different instructions since the Supreme
Court's last word on the subject, three of which have been presented to
the Third Circuit in the past four years. 98 Only one of these instructions
was found to be prejudicial to the defendant. 99 Taken together, these de-
cisions illustrate an important trend within the Third Circuit: the broad
acceptance of the hesitate to act language as terminology that can over-
come otherwise improper language within a charge."'
94. See Crescent-Kelvan Co., 164 F.2d at 588 (finding reversible error where trial
judge mistakenly stated "that is the preponderance of the evidencd' at end of reasonable
doubt charge); Augustine, 189 F.2d at 591 (noting that trialjudge should have used
.you must acquit" instead of "you may acquit" at end of charge).
95. See Link, 202 F.2d at 594 (finding that instruction stating, "if you find the
evidence as to this defendant equally balanced, that is, that it is as consistent with
innocence as it is with guilt, you must acquit," was confusing to jury thus creating
reversible error).
96. See, e.g., Polan, 970 F.2d at 1286 (holding reasonable doubt instruction
constitutional despite fact that court would not "recommend" future use of chal-
lenged terms). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's failure to reverse decisions
in cases where they express disapproval of the language used in the jury charges,
see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 1226 (acknowledging inability to strike down
instruction in light of Victor, and therefore strongly emphasizing that instruction
should no longer be used).
98. See West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 63-64 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding instruc-
tion with substantial doubt and hesitate to act language); United States v. Her-
nandez, 176 F.3d 719, 729-33 (3d Cir. 1999) (striking down instruction defining
reasonable doubt as "what you feel inside"); United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 203-
04 (3d Cir. 1998) (upholding instruction with hesitate to act language);Jacobs, 44
F.3d at 1226 (upholding instruction using "moral certainty," "hesitate to act" and
two-inference instruction); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 757 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that "hesitate to act" is not necessary to make instruction constitutionally
adequate).
99. See Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 731-33 (finding instruction unconstitutional be-
cause it permitted jurors to convict based on "gut feeling").




Corwin: Defining Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt for the Criminal Jury: T
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46: p. 829
1. United States v. Jacobs: "Moral Certainty" Disfavored But Upheld
In United States v. Jacobs, II the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld an instruction using the moral certainty and hesitate
to act terminology. 10 2 Relying on Victor, the Third Circuit found the in-
struction constitutionally sufficient when viewed as a whole, reasoning that
the hesitate to act language overcame the other deficient language in the
charge. l0 3 The Third Circuit stated, however, that moral certainty was an
antiquated phrase that "should no longer be given" in light of the Su-
preme Court's criticism.10
4
Despite the Third Circuit's admonition against trial courts' further
use of the definition, it is difficult to imagine the court reversing a trial
court decision using the moral certainty phraseology, even without the
hesitate to act language.' 0 5 Even though there has been a long-term de-
cline in the use of the moral certainty language since the Supreme Court's
decision in Cage, the Third Circuit has repeatedly upheld such lan-
guage.10 6 When coupled with language such as "hesitate to act" or "abid-
ing conviction," the moral certainty phrase will likely survive appellate
review.10 7
2. United States v. Isaac: Two-Inference Instruction Revived
In United States v. Isaac,1° 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld a two-inference charge that instructed the jury to
101. 44 F.3d 1219 (3d Cir. 1995).
102. See id. at 1226 (finding no due process violation). The instruction in
Jacobs charged, in pertinent part:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be of such a convinc-
ing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without
hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. A reasonable doubt
exists whenever, after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the
evidence in this case or lack of it, you do not feel convinced to a moral
certainty that the defendant is guilty of the charge.
Id. at 1225. The charge in Jacobs also used a two-inference instruction:
So if you view the evidence in this case as reasonably permitting either of
two conclusions, one of innocence and the other of guilt, you should
adopt the conclusion of innocence and return a verdict of not guilty, be-
cause a defendant is never to be convicted on mere suspicion or
conjecture.
103. Id. at 1226 & n.8.
See id. at 1226 (relying on Victor in finding instruction adequately conveyed
standard to jury).
104. Id.
105. Cf Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d at 736, 757 (3d Cir. 1995) (establishing
that hesitate to act language is not necessary to overcome language in instruction
that had previously been found to be problematic).
106. See, e.g., Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 1226 (upholding instruction using moral cer-
tainty language).
107. See id. (permitting use of instruction pairing "hesitate to act" with "moral
certainty"); Berkowitz v. United States, 5 F.2d at 967, 967 (3d Cir. 1925) (approv-
ing use of instruction pairing "abiding conviction" with "moral certainty").
108. 134 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 1998).
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acquit if the evidence reasonably permitted either of two conclusions-
one of innocence and the other of guilt.1° 9 Prior to Victor, the only rea-
sonable doubt instruction which the Supreme Court reversed for prejudi-
cial error on substantive grounds contained precisely the same
language.' 10 Furthermore, the Third Circuit has recognized the harsh
criticism of the two-inference instruction by the Second Circuit and has
cautioned trial courts against its further use. 
1 1
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit upheld the instruction in Isaac, stating
that "although we disapproved of the 'two-inference' instruction in Jacobs,
we did not hold that the instruction was so constitutionally deficient per se
that it infected the entire instruction on reasonable doubt."' 1 2 The Third
Circuit found that the hesitate to act language counterbalanced the defect
caused by the two-inference charge.
11 3
After Isaac, it is clear that despite the Third Circuit's criticism of the
charge, a two-inference instruction will survive when coupled with the
hesitate to act language.' 14 Furthermore, it is likely that such an instruc-
tion will survive in the Third Circuit without the help of the hesitate to act
language, so long as the court can point to a portion of the charge that
will counteract the defect.1 15
3. West v. Vaughn: "Substantial Doubt" Still Lives
In its most recent ruling on this issue, West v. Vaughn,116 the Third
Circuit upheld an instruction using the problematic substantial doubt lan-
guage. 11 7 The charge defined reasonable doubt as the type of "substantial
109. See id. at 202 ("So if the jury views the evidence in the case as reasonably
permitting either of two conclusions, one of innocence, the other of guilt, the jury
should, of course, adopt the conclusion of innocence.").
110. See United States v. Link, 202 F.2d 592, 594 (3d Cir. 1953) (striking down
instruction that stated "if you find the evidence as to this defendant equally bal-
anced, that is, that it is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt, you must
acquit").
111. See United States v.Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1226 (1995) (stressing that criti-
cism by Second Circuit "should be heeded" when "specifically brought to attention
of trial judges").
112. Isaac, 134 F.3d at 203.
113. See id. at 204 (stating that "defect was counterbalanced by explanation
that preceded and succeeded it").
114. Cf id. at 204 (declaring that hesitate to act language provides jurors with
.comprehensible benchmark").
115. See Fortunato, supra note 24, at 396-405 (examining how circuit courts
uphold suspect definitions by pointing to "bland and nondescriptive declarations"
of state's burden).
116. 204 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 2000).
117. See id. at 63-64 (upholding instruction that went beyond statement of
"substantial doubt" and further defined standard). The instruction in West, in per-
tinent part, stated:
And there are matters of high importance to all of us in our lives in which
evaluating the evidence that we are using to make that decision, we come
up with the kind and quality of evidence that makes us pause and hesitate
2001]
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doubt that makes peoplepause before they plunge into action."' 18 Relying
on its decision in Flamer v. Delaware,' 19 and the Supreme Court's decision
in Victor, the Third Circuit held that the substantial doubt phraseology did
not rise to the level of constitutional error because it was used in an other-
wise unobjectionable charge. 121
The Third Circuit further adhered to Victor by concluding that the
hesitate to act terminology used in the instruction was not likely to mislead
a jury because it "gives a common sense benchmark for just how substan-
tial such a doubt must be."121 The West opinion is thus another Third
Circuit decision that illustrates the expansive adoption of "hesitate to act"
as the saving grace for otherwise disfavored reasonable doubt instructions.
The decisions in Flamer and West confirm that the substantial doubt phrase
will likely be upheld in the Third Circuit when accompanied by hesitate to
act language, and even when not. 122
4. United States v. Hernandez: "Hesitate to Act" Can Not Cure All
Deficiencies
Despite the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's
wide acceptance of the hesitate to act language, as overcoming common
deficiencies in reasonable doubt instructions, the court drew the line in
1999 when it decided United States v. Hernandez. 123 In Hernandez, the Third
Circuit struck down a reasonable doubt instruction for the first time since
1953.124 The jury in Hernandez was given several instructions during the
before we make a decision. Now, it is this kind of doubt that we are talk-
ing about in this case, in all criminal cases, the kind of substantial doubt that
makes people pause before they plunge into action that is going to in-
volve some important interests on their part.
Id. at 56.
118. Id. at 56.
119. 68 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 1995). The instruction in Flamer stated that:
Reasonable doubt does not mean a vague, speculative or whimsical doubt, nor a
mere possible doubt, but a substantial doubt and such a doubt as intelligent,
reasonable and impartial men and women may honestly entertain after a
careful and conscientious consideration of the evidence in the case.
Id. at 757.
120. See West, 204 F.3d at 64 (holding that although sentence equating reason-
able doubt with "substantial doubt" was problematic, phraseology does not render
instruction constitutionally suspect, as whole, when charge is otherwise
unobjectionable).
121. Id. (quoting Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Victor v. Nebraska,
511 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1994)).
122. Compare West, 204 F.3d at 64 (finding that hesitate to act language over-
came suspect substantial doubt phrase), with Flamer, 68 F.3d at 757 (maintaining
that hesitate to act language is not needed to uphold instruction using substantial
doubt phraseology).
123. 176 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1999).
124. See United States v. Link, 202 F.2d 592, 594 (3d Cir. 1953) (striking down
reasonable doubt instruction).
[Vol. 46: p. 829
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trial. 125 Before the jury heard any evidence, they were told that a reasona-
ble doubt is "what you in your own heart and your own soul and your own spirit
and your own judgment determine [it] is .... -126 At the end of the trial, the
judge gave a traditional "hesitate to act" charge and instructed the jury
that all the instructions they were given throughout the trial should re-
ceive equal weight.1 27
In Hernandez, the Third Circuit ruled that "when an erroneous in-
struction is given, a subsequent clarification must be sufficiently clear and
compelling" to conclude that the initial inaccuracy did not affect the jury's
deliberations.1 28 The Third Circuit found that a reasonable likelihood ex-
isted that the jurors utilized the improper definition and convicted the
defendant based on a "gut feeling."1 29 Although the jurors eventually
heard a proper definition, the Third Circuit noted that at that point "they
had been forewarned that the definition they were hearing was less helpful
than the prior erroneous explanation ... ."1.30
125. See Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 728-30 (setting out trial court instructions
given during jury selection, before evidence was heard and at end of trial).
126. Id. at 729. This charge, in pertinent part, read:
There is no specific definition. I'm sorry to tell you, but there are none.
It's what you in your own heart and your own soul and your own spirit
and your own judgment determine is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
I'll give you some definitions at the end of the trial when I give the
Judge's charge to the jury, but don't expect it to be the kind of ruler or
measuring rod that you are going to be able to say: Uh-huh, now, I know
what proof beyond a reasonable doubt means.
Id. The Third Circuit found this instruction inadequate because it elicited a con-
viction based on jurors' subjective feelings about the defendant's guilt. See id. at
732 (stating that "subjective belief must be based upon reasoned, objective evalua-
tion of the evidence").
127. See id. at 730 (quoting district court's charge which stated, in part, "Each
phase of the instructions is to be considered and applied together with all other
parts and phases of the instructions"). The hesitate to act instruction in Hernandez
stated:
A reasonable doubt is doubt based on reason and common sense. A rea-
sonable doubt is such a doubt as would cause you to hesitate to act in
matters of importance in your own lives. A reasonable doubt may arise
from a lack of evidence. It is doubt based on reason, logic, common
sense and experience. Reasonable doubt is not vague or hypothetical
doubt. It is not speculative, imaginary qualms or misgivings.
Id.
128. Id. at 731 (finding no subsequent "clear and compelling" clarification to
overcome instruction using "what you feel inside" as definition of reasonable
doubt).
129. See id. (finding that there was likelihood that jurors convicted defendant
not because government proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, but because
they felt defendant was guilty).
130. Id. at 733. The Court was apparently referring to the portion of the
charge stating, "I'll give you some definitions at the end of the trial ... but don't
expect them to be the kind of ruler or measuring rod that you are going to be able
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The hesitate to act language, sometimes termed the "analogy ap-
proach," is the most widely used definition amongst the state (and lower
federal) courts. 13 1 The Third Circuit approves of it as a "comprehensible
benchmark."' 32 Although the phrase may counterbalance the terminol-
ogy struck down in Cage and Sullivan (and later upheld in Victor), it cannot
compensate for instructions so faulty as to influence ajury to apply a stan-
dard lower than that required by due process. 133 Furthermore, practition-
ers should note that the hesitate to act language has been criticized by
both Supreme CourtJustice Ginsburg and the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the First and Second Circuits.' 34
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION: DEFENDANTS FIGHT AN UPHILL BATTLE IN
ESTABLISHING A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
A. Difficulty in Proving Unconstitutionality of Reasonable Doubt Instructions
The test for establishing a due process violation requires a finding
that there exists a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the burden
of proof instruction to allow conviction based on lesser degree of certainty
than that embodied in the reasonable doubt standard.135 After Victor, it is
clear that the Supreme Court will not lead an effort to generate its own
constitutionally adequate instruction. 136 Therefore, almost any reasona-
ble doubt instruction that does not wildly misstate the standard may be
deemed sufficient for conviction. 13 7
Furthermore, practitioners should note that jury charges may be ren-
dered "virtually impregnable to defense attack on appeal because any 'mis-
description' of the standard is 'neutralized' by such bland and
nondescriptive declarations as 'the state's burden is to prove its case be-
yond a reasonable doubt,' 'the burden is a high one and never shifts to the
131. See Newman, supra note 81, at 982 (describing "hesitate to act" as most
widely used explanation).
132. See United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1998) ("By analogiz-
ing the standard of proof to the level of certainty an individual would require
before unhesitatingly acting in important personal affairs, the court provided ju-
rors with a comprehensible benchmark." (emphasis added)).
133. See Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 733 (holding that instruction using "hesitate to
act," when taken as whole, was not enough to "'unring' the bell").
134. For firther discussion of this criticism, see supra notes 52-80.
135. SeeVictor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994) (reiterating holding in Estelle,
Court stated, "In a subsequent case, we made clear that the proper inquiry is not
whether the instruction 'could have' been applied in an unconstitutional manner,
but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it" (citing
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 & n.4 (1991))).
136. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 38 (stating that Victor holding makes clear
that "Court will not lead an effort to rewrite reasonable doubt instructions, nor will
the due process clause serve as a tool for prodding such an effort").
137. See, e.g., Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 731 (finding instruction unconstitutional
because it permitted jurors to convict based on "gut feeling").
[Vol. 46: p. 829
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defendant' and 'the defendant is presumed innocent.""138 There is, how-
ever, a small glimmer of hope found in the Hernandez decision, which sug-
gests that one line in a lengthy instruction can be enough to render the
whole instruction unconstitutional.
1 39
B. Trial Judges' Responsibility in Making Jury Instructions Comprehensible
Trial judges have effectively been given permission to use confusing
and misleading instructions because a charge that contains language pre-
viously labeled as "confusing" or "problematic" can be saved by the review-
ing court's determination that the charge, taken as a whole, could not
reasonably have misled thejurors1 40 Because a standard of general appli-
cation has not yet been (and may never be) adopted, and because appel-
late review assesses only the legal sufficiency of instructions, trial judges
may want to entertain policy considerations when drafting their instruc-
tions. 141 Most importantly, juror miscomprehension seems to be a funda-
mental factor in the misapplication of the reasonable doubt standard.142
Although reasonable doubt instructions may pass constitutional mus-
ter, they can have decision effects that conflict with the standard's pur-
pose. 143 Substantial empirical data shows that jurors do not comprehend
the standard on its face.14 4 Furthermore,jurors are unable to understand
138. Fortunato, supra note 24, at 396; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 281 (1993) (stating that "the essential connection to a 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' factual finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a
misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings"); Ad-
ams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1994) (" Victor explains that the offending
words can be neutralized by words or phrases that preclude the jury from requir-
ing more than a reasonable doubt to acquit.").
139. See Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 737 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (finding that ma-
jority relied on one sentence in eight page instruction to find due process
violation).
140. See Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient Jury In-
structions, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1105, 1106 (2000) (maintaining that judges choose
among alternative instructions with regard solely to whether instruction meets
standard of minimum accuracy, rather than to whether jurors are more likely to
understand and correctly apply it).
141. See Kenney, supra note 18, at 1022-23 (noting that Supreme Court has
failed to help clarify standard by not giving approved definition); Power, supra
note 2, at 48 (discussing casual interest in misapplication of standard and lack of
leadership by Supreme Court).
142. See Solan, supra note 4, at 132 (analyzing empirical data as indicating that
misunderstanding of term "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" ensures that convic-
tions occur even when jury does not have "highest degree of certitude"). But see
Power, supra note 2, at 103 (stating that jury misapplication is result of other fac-
tors besides linguistic flaws, including jury education, training of trial attorneys
and lack of firm consensus by legal profession as to meaning of reasonable doubt).
143. See Brown, supra note 140, at 1109-10 (discussing research that shows
reasonable doubt instructions conflict with purpose of standard "by mislead[ing]
jurors into expecting defendant to present evidence raising articulable doubt
about guilt").
144. See, e.g., Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, supra note 6, at 668 (finding that subject
group not given definition exhibited probabilities of guilt that would be constitu-
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the legal terminology in poorly written and overly complex instructions. 145
Therefore, in order to guard against unjust convictions, trial courts must
develop constitutionally adequate instructions that are comprehensible to
the layperson.
146
tionally unacceptable); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Under-
stand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror
Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 401, 402, 414 (1990) (discussing project
that tested six-hundred jurors' comprehension on meaning of reasonable doubt
and found that only about one-quarter knew that it did not mean any possibility of
doubt, no matter how slight); RobertJ. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric
Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOc.
PSYCHOL. 21, 21-22 (1988) (observing unacceptably high rate of conviction in weak
case when jurors were given no definition of reasonable doubt). Anecdotal evi-
dence appears to corroborate the results of such studies. See Juror's Use of Dictionary
Helps Defendant Win Reversal, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 21 (discussing acquittal of
defendant after juror went home, consulted dictionary on definition of reasonable
doubt and shared definition with other jurors).
145. See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE
12-17 (1982) (identifying use of jargon or legalese as most common problem with
instructions); Cohen, supra note 2, at 698 (describing jury instructions as "often
loaded with legal jargon, difficult vocabulary and complex word structures"); Lau-
rence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to Comprehend
and Apply CriminalJury Instructions, 17 L. & Soc'v REV. 153, 157 (1982) (acknowl-
edging problem of legalese in instructions); David U. Strawn & Raymond W.
Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 478 (1976)
(same); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology ofJuly Instructions, 69 NEB. L.
REv. 71, 79 (1990) (stating that all empirical studies agree that "typical patternjury
instructions ... are incomprehensible to jurors"). For a more thorough discussion
of research on the comprehension of reasonable doubt, see Rita J. Simon & Linda
Mahan, Probability Statements of Sufficiency of Proof in Criminal Trials and Civil Trials,
inA HANDBOOK OFJURY RESEARCH 19-1 to 19-11 (Walter F. Abbott &John Batt eds.,
1999).
146. See generally Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions
That Jurors Can Understand, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1984) (proposing
revised pattern instruction in light of study results); Severance & Loftus, sup#ra note
145 (conducting three separate studies and proposing improved methods for in-
structing jurors); see also Solan, supra note 4, at 125 (discussing study that showed
jurors are less likely to convict when definitions focus on government's burden as
opposed to defendant's ability to establish doubt). Judges might want to take note
of the fact that several courts are now using a fairly comprehensible definition
issued by the Federal Judicial Center and strongly supported by Supreme Court
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Victor. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMI-
NAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 21, at 29 (1998), stating that:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced
of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we
know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not re-
quire proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your con-
sideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged, your must find him guilty. If on the other
hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must
give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg asserts that this model "instruction plainly
informs the jurors that the prosecution must prove its case by more than a mere
preponderance of the evidence, yet not necessarily to an absolute certainty."
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 27 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting fur-
24




In the wake of the Third Circuit's recent rulings on the constitutional-
ity of reasonable doubt instructions, it seems that nearly any sensible phra-
seology defining reasonable doubt will be sufficient. 147 Even terminology
historically categorized as problematic will withstand appellate review. 148
So long as a trial court does not outrageously err in its definition, criminal
defendants will have an extremely difficult time establishing due process
violations. 149
Melissa Cowin
ther that "[t]his model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the rea-
sonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly").
147. See Kenney, supra note 18, at 1022 (noting reluctance of Supreme Court
to declare instructions unconstitutional as it might require relitigating multitude
of cases because harmless error analysis does not apply).
148. For further discussion of problematic instructions that have been up-
held, see supra notes 40, 41, 70, 74, 102, 109 & 117 and accompanying text.
149. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 500 (R 30)
(3d ed. 2000) (noting rare occasions where courts have strayed so far from usual
forms of instructing on reasonable doubt that appellate courts have reversed).
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